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THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL JURY:
SEARCHING FOR A MIDDLE GROUND
NEIL VIDMAR*
I
INTRODUCTION
In many important respects, the contemporary Canadian criminal jury sys-
tem may be viewed as a hybrid of the English and American jury systems.  This
statement does not imply a direct American influence on the conception of the
jury because, as will be discussed below, Canadian judges have often expressly
rejected American practices, and in the very recent past, tended to defer pri-
marily to England when seeking guidance from case law.  Nevertheless, on a
number of dimensions, Canadian jury law and practice occupies a middle
ground between that of these other two countries.
I can begin to make the point clear by describing a Canadian trial, R. v.
Bernardo,1 that overlapped the O.J. Simpson murder trial in the United States.
Recall that Simpson, a former American football star and television celebrity,
was charged with the vicious knife-slaying of his former wife and a young man
just outside his ex-wife’s residence.  Aside from the fact that the Simpson trial
involved a famous football player and television celebrity charged with grue-
some knife-slayings, there were important trial characteristics that could occur
only in some American jurisdictions.  The preliminary hearing and the entire
trial were televised.  The prospective jurors were given a lengthy questionnaire
that asked about their personal attitudes, beliefs, and lifestyles, and then they
were questioned at length in court on their views in a process that took weeks
of court time before the jury was chosen.  In addition, alternate jurors were se-
lected to sit with the other jurors in the event one or more of the jurors were
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1. The case of R. v. Bernardo is unreported.  For related litigation, see Thompson Newspapers
Ltd. v. The Queen [1994] 121 D.L.R.4th 42 (Ont. C.A.).  My account of the Homolka and Bernardo
trials is developed from personal sources as well as media accounts.  A reasonable summary of the
Bernardo case can be found in the weekly issues of Maclean’s magazine from May 15, 1995 through
October 16, 1995.  More detailed accounts of the trial can be found in the Toronto Globe and Mail or
Toronto Star newspapers covering that same period.  See, e.g., Nick Pron & John Duncanson, Bernardo
Trial Has Jury Pool of 1,500, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 11, 1995, at A1.  Other discussions of the back-
ground of the case and the trial can be found in FRANK DAVEY, KARLA’S WEB: A CULTURAL
INVESTIGATION OF THE MAHAFFY-FRENCH MURDERS (1994); STEPHEN WILLIAMS, INVISIBLE
DARKNESS: THE STRANGE CASE OF PAUL BERNARDO AND KARLA HOMOLKA (1996).
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excused for illness or other reasons.  The jurors were sequestered for the entire
time of the months-long trial.  In mid-trial, several jurors were removed and
replaced by alternates, on the suspicion that they were planning to sell the story
of the jury deliberations to tabloid newspapers or book publishers at the trial’s
conclusion.  Lawyers for the prosecution and defense engaged in media inter-
views while the trial was in progress.
Simpson’s trial captured world-wide attention when it was broadcast over
the CNN television network.  While in many respects Simpson’s trial was an
anomaly within the United States,2 contrasting it with Bernardo is useful be-
cause, like the Simpson case, the crimes of which Bernardo was accused were
heinous, the case captured the attention of the Canadian public, and it raised
serious threats to the integrity of the Canadian legal process.  However, the
Bernardo case shows some restrictions on media coverage that evokes compari-
son with England, Australia, and New Zealand.  Its jury selection process and
trial controls contrast markedly with the United States.  The case also raises the
specter of attempts to control pretrial publicity in any country in an age of in-
ternational mass media and the internet.
Against a backdrop of a series of rapes by the “Scarborough rapist” that
terrorized a number of Toronto suburbs beginning in mid-1990, two teenage
girls, Linda Mahaffy and Kristen French, went missing in 1991 and 1992.  Their
sexually abused bodies were subsequently found.  Mahaffy’s body had been
dismembered by a power saw, encased in cement, and dumped in a lake.  Police
were stymied until January 1993, when Karla Homolka, an attractive twenty-
three year-old woman residing in St. Catherines, Ontario, was severely beaten
by her twenty-nine year-old husband, Paul Bernardo.  In the police investiga-
tion that followed, Homolka confessed that she had participated with Bernardo
in the kidnapping, sexual enslavement, and degradation of the two teenagers.
Homolka nevertheless insisted that Bernardo alone murdered the girls.  She
also eventually implicated Bernardo (and herself) in numerous other sexual
crimes, including the drugging and rape of her younger sister, Tammy, that ac-
cidentally resulted in the girl’s death.  The latter incident had to that point been
treated as a natural but unexplained death.  Finally, she informed the authori-
ties that the rape and torture of Mahaffy and French, each occurring over sev-
eral days, had been videotaped by Bernardo.
Bernardo was arrested and charged as the Scarborough rapist in February
1993 and later charged with kidnapping, rape, and murder.  Canadian and U.S.
media covered the story extensively and engaged in much speculation about the
crimes, but police and prosecutors remained tight-lipped.  After many searches
of the couple’s home over a period of seventy days, police failed to find the
videotapes.  Thus, Homolka became the Crown’s crucial witness against her
husband, and a highly controversial plea bargain was struck in May 1993.  For
her full cooperation and testimony, Homolka would receive two twelve-year
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sentences for manslaughter to be served concurrently.  At her June 1993 plea
and sentencing trial, the judge allowed Canadian media representatives to be
present, but in an attempt to preserve the integrity of the Bernardo trial, he
drew upon common law precedent to forbid them from publishing any details
until the latter trial was completed.
Despite the reporting ban, public rumors about the Homolka and Bernardo
crimes were intense.  Radio and print media in nearby Buffalo, New York, as
well as other American mass media, reported some of the forbidden informa-
tion.  A public opinion survey in December 1993 found that many persons in
the trial venue (moved to Toronto from St. Catherines) reported that they had
learned details of the case from other persons, from reading U.S. newspapers,
or from facsimile or internet communications.3  Bernardo’s public trial did not
commence until May 1995, but in the interim, the case had been kept before
the public by litigation over the publication ban, the resignation of Bernardo’s
first lawyer and the appointment of a new defense team, publicity from various
victims’ rights groups, widespread dissemination of anonymous flyers reporting
erroneous and gruesome details about the Mahaffy and French deaths, media
editorials about the Homolka plea bargain, and allegations of police incompe-
tence.4  Moreover, rumors surfaced that the missing videotapes had been found
and would be used as evidence.  These last rumors turned out to be true.5
When the trial began in May 1995, 980 prospective jurors were summoned
to appear at the ballroom of the downtown Royal York Hotel, which had been
turned into a large courtroom.  The charges against the accused were read—
two counts each of first-degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful confinement, and
aggravated sexual assault, and one count of causing an indignity to a corpse.
Bernardo pleaded not guilty to each count.  Jury selection began.  In order to
eliminate persons who believed they could not serve under the trial conditions,
Associate Chief Justice Patrick LeSage, the trial judge, explained to the assem-
bled panel that the trial would last for an estimated four months and that the
jurors would be required to view very explicit photographs and videos of sexual
acts.  Over the next three days, the remaining members of the panel were ran-
domly called one-by-one to a nearby courtroom, placed under oath, and asked
up to eight questions in a procedure that Canadian law calls a “challenge for
cause.”6
                                                          
3. See Angus Reid Group, Inc., Public Opinion on Publication Bans and the Homolka Trial (Dec.
29, 1993).
4. The editorials involved general discussion of the issues and the need for investigation and
thorough public airing of the matter after the Bernardo trial was completed, when the media would be
free from the judicial restraint.
5. Bernardo’s first lawyer obtained possession of the videotapes from information provided by
his client, following the 70-day police search of Bernardo’s home.  Eventually the tapes were turned
over to the prosecution.  The investigation into possible obstruction of justice is described in
BERNARDO INVESTIGATION REVIEW, BERNARDO INVESTIGATION REVIEW: REPORT OF MR.
JUSTICE ARCHIE CAMPBELL (1996).
6. For more discussion of the challenge for cause, see infra Part III.B.3.
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The questions asked of the jurors were as follows:7 (1) Have you read,
heard, or seen anything about this case in the media (newspapers, radio, or
television)?  (2) Have you obtained information about it from anywhere else?
(3) Have you read, heard, or seen anything about the accused’s, Paul Ber-
nardo’s, background, character, or lifestyle?  (4) Have you read, heard, or seen
anything about Karla Homolka or about her trial?  (5) As a result of this case,
some groups and organizations have circulated petitions or have sought support
concerning issues which relate to this case, the victims, or their families.  Have
you supported any of these groups or associations, for example, by signing a pe-
tition, writing a letter of support, or by making a donation?  (6) As a result of
any knowledge, discussion, and/or contact with any group or organization, have
you formed an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the accused, Paul Ber-
nardo?  (7) If you have formed an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the
accused, are you able to set aside that opinion and decide this case only on the
evidence you hear in the courtroom and the judge’s directions on the law?  (8)
Answer the following question with a yes or no:  Is there anything we have not
asked you about why you could not judge this case fairly and impartially ac-
cording to the evidence heard at trial and the judge’s directions on the law?
Beyond their responses to these questions, no other information about the ju-
rors, other than physical appearance and demeanor in the courtroom, was
available to the Crown prosecutor or the defense lawyer.
In contrast to U.S. practice,8 the trial judge does not have authority to de-
termine which jurors are impartial and which are not.9  Rather, that decision is
placed in the hands of two layperson “triers.”  For the selection of the first ju-
ror, two persons are randomly chosen from the venire panel and sworn to serve
as triers.10  They listen to the prospective jurors’ answers to the questions and,
under instructions from the judge, render a verdict on whether he or she is
“impartial between the Queen and the accused.”  If a prospective juror is found
to be not impartial, another is called, and the process continues until an unbi-
ased juror is found.  After the first juror is chosen, he or she replaces one of the
                                                          
7.  See Excerpts from R. v. Bernardo, in JURY TRIALS (National Judicial Institute, Nov. 27-29,
1995).
8. See NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES 2-3 (1997).
9. Throughout the rest of this article, I will sometimes be sparse with citations to specific author-
ity and procedures.  The interested reader should consult the following sources for details: E.G.
EWASCHUK, CRIMINAL PLEADINGS & PRACTICE IN CANADA (2d ed. 1998); CHRISTOPHER
GRANGER, THE CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL IN CANADA (2d ed. 1996); THE MEDIA, THE COURTS AND
THE CHARTER (Philip Anisman & Allen M. Linden eds., 1986); ALAN W. MEWETT, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN CANADA (2d ed. 1992); R.E. SALHANY, CANADIAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (6th ed. 1998); DAVID M. TANOVICH ET AL., JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS (1997).
10. For a description of challenge for cause in another case and an assessment of its effectiveness,
see Neil Vidmar & Julius Melnitzer, Juror Prejudice: An Empirical Study of a Challenge for Cause, 22
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 487 (1984).  The history of this procedure in Canada has not been explored, but
it undoubtedly comes directly from English law.  See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *363;
JAMES KENNEDY, LAW AND PRACTICE OF JURIES 90 (1826); see also Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullifi-
cation Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1998)
(documenting the existence of triers in colonial and post-colonial America).
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triers to choose the second impartial juror.  The first two jurors then serve as
triers for juror number three; jurors two and three are the triers for juror four;
the rotating “trier” schedule continues until twelve jurors are seated.11  How-
ever, even if the triers decide that a person is impartial, either the Crown or the
defendant can exercise one of their peremptory challenges—twenty are pro-
vided for each side in a murder case—necessitating other jurors to be called
and tried until that juror slot is filled.  If a juror is acceptable to both sides, he
or she is seated in the jury box for the remainder of the proceeding.  When the
twelfth juror is chosen, the jury is sworn.
With some persons excused for hardship, others excused for bias, and oth-
ers rejected through peremptory challenges exercised by the prosecution and
the defense, 225 veniremen were called in the Bernardo case before a jury was
seated.  There were no alternate jurors.  The total jury selection process took
five days, an extraordinarily lengthy proceeding for a Canadian trial.  When all
twelve were selected, the judge admonished the jurors not to discuss the case
with anyone, told them that a number of legal matters still had to be resolved,
and ordered them to return in two and a half weeks for the commencement of
the trial.
At the end of May, the trial began with television and print coverage that
was unprecedented in Canadian history.  Although radio and television were
not allowed in the courtroom, the streets outside were jammed with communi-
cations equipment.  Long queues of spectators waited for the limited public
seating.  The trial involved some of the most disturbing evidence ever heard
and seen in a Canadian courtroom.  Graphic videotapes of the rapes and tor-
ture of the two girls were played over and over and over for the jury.  The press
and public were allowed to hear the audio portion of the days and hours of the
victims’ torture and humiliation by Bernardo and Homolka, but only the jury
and court officials saw, as well as heard, the evidence.  Nevertheless, the audio
portion, as well as Karla Homolka’s testimony, left little for the imagination,
and the print media reported it extensively.  Throughout the trial, the jurors
went, unescorted, back to their homes each evening.  They were not seques-
tered until they began their deliberations some four months after the trial be-
gan.  Paul Bernardo was found guilty of the murders and other charges and sen-
tenced to life in prison.12  We will likely never learn how the jurors reached
their verdict because Canadian law forbids jurors to ever disclose anything
about their deliberations.
                                                          
11. One consequence of this unique procedure, of course, is that to a considerable degree the
members of the jury are responsible for its make-up.  I do not propose to explore the implications of
this self-selection process for group cohesion in this article, but draw the matter to the reader’s atten-
tion.  Another consequence is that through taking part in, as well as observing, the challenge process,
the jurors are further educated about the importance of being impartial.
12. Canada permanently abolished capital punishment in 1976 after a 14-year moratorium on
hanging.  See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 331.  Under the life sentence, Bernardo would be eligible to
apply for parole after 25 years.  However, in a subsequent proceeding initiated by the Crown, he was
found to be a dangerous offender and is now serving an indefinite life sentence, although that indefi-
nite sentence is subject to periodic review.
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Before elaborating on the law and rationale behind the procedures involved
in the Bernardo trial, let us consider the history of the Canadian jury and de-
velop a profile of the Canadian jury today.13
II
PROFILE OF THE CANADIAN CRIMINAL JURY
A. The History of the Right to Jury Trial in Canada and the Scope of That
Right
English common law, including the right to trial by jury, was followed al-
most from the beginning of the development of the separate English colonies
that eventually became the nation of Canada.  For example, Nova Scotia rec-
ognized the right to jury trial in 1758 and, following the defeat of the French
army on the Plains of Abraham outside Quebec City, the law of England was
established in the colony of Quebec in 1763.  Although French civil law was re-
stored in Quebec in 1774, English criminal law remained in force.  Under the
British North America Act, which established the Dominion of Canada in 1867,
the federal Parliament was granted jurisdiction over criminal law, but the
provinces maintained certain rights over the administration of that law.  In
1892, Parliament passed the Criminal Code that recognized the right to jury
trial for serious offenses.  When the Constitution Act, known as the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”), was passed in 1982, it specifically
recognized the right to jury trial:  “Any person charged with an offense has the
right . . . except in the case of an offense under military law tried before a mili-
tary tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury where the maximum penalty for the
offense is imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment . . . .”14
Although the right to jury trial is enshrined in the Charter, it needs to be
understood in the context of the Criminal Code.15  When it passed the uniform
Criminal Code of 1892, Parliament followed Sir James Fitzjames Stevens’s
draft English code of 1879,16 and its basic structure is retained in the modern
Criminal Code.17  The Code divides offenses into three types.18  Indictable of-
fenses include the most serious crimes, such as murder and treason.  Murder
and treason must be tried in a superior court before a judge and jury.  Summary
conviction offenses are less serious offenses, such as driving while disqualified,
keeping a common bawdy house, and theft or fraud under $5,000.  These of-
fenses involve maximum punishments of no more than two years in jail (the
                                                          
13. For general discussion on the origins of trial by jury in criminal cases in England and Canada,
see GRANGER, supra note 9, at 11, 26.  See also generally DESMOND H. BROWN, THE GENESIS OF THE
CANADIAN CRIMINAL CODE OF 1892 (1989).
14. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms),
§i11(f) [hereinafter Charter].
15. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 (1985) (Can.).
16. See generally  BROWN, supra note 13.
17. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 36.
18. See id. at 37-54.
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typical maximum for a summary offense is six months in jail) and a fine less
than $5,000.  Summary offenses are tried by judge alone in a lower court, and
there is no right to jury trial.  The third category involves hybrid offenses that
can be tried either as an indictable crime or as a summary conviction offense.
Offenses falling under this category include assaults of all kinds, serious fraud,
conspiracy, being an accessory to a crime, and drug offenses.  The decision to
proceed by indictment is solely determined by the Crown Attorney, that is, the
public prosecutor, and, with a few exceptions, is not subject to judicial review.
However, once the Crown has elected to proceed by indictment, the accused
person has the right to decide whether to be tried by judge and jury or by judge
alone for most offenses.19
Canada has two official languages, English and French.  Section 530 of the
Code provides that an accused has the right to be tried by a judge and jury who
speak the language of the accused, or, if special circumstances warrant it, a
judge and jury composed of persons who speak both languages.20  Section 531
provides that a change of venue to a different territory within a province may
be made in order to obtain a jury with the required language skills.21
It is difficult to obtain nationwide statistics on the absolute number of
criminal jury trials or what percentage of accused persons elect for jury trial
when they have that option.  However, in 1993 in Ontario, the largest province,
with a population of eleven million persons (approximately one-third of Can-
ada’s entire population), there were 1,018 criminal jury trials in the General
Division Court, a superior court.22  In contrast, there were 1,368 nonjury trials.
Some of the jury trials involved murder or other offenses that are required to
be tried by judge and jury.  Even discounting these cases involving no option
regarding the choice of factfinder, more accused persons who pleaded not
guilty elected for trial by judge alone than trial by jury.  When summary convic-
tion offenses are taken into account, the vast bulk of criminal cases, at least
ninety percent, are tried by judge alone.23  Nevertheless, the institution of the
criminal jury continues to occupy an important place in Canadian law.
B. The Structure and Composition of the Jury and Its Verdict
The Canadian jury is always composed of twelve persons.24  No provision is
made for alternate jurors and removal of a juror is considered to be a very seri-
ous matter.  However, a juror can be discharged if he or she becomes ill at any
time during the course of the trial, or there is some other “reasonable cause” to
discharge a juror.  The judge is also vested with the power to declare a mistrial.
                                                          
19. However, a few offenses are not eligible for jury trial.  See Criminal Code, supra note 15,
§§i469, 553.
20. See id. § 530.
21. See id. § 531.
22. See ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE USE OF JURY TRIALS
IN CIVIL CASES 6-7 (1994).
23. This statement is based on personal communications with Professor David Paciocco.
24. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 631(5) (1985) (Can.).
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The judge may continue the trial as long as ten jurors remain.25  Conviction of
an accused by a jury of ten or eleven members has been held to be constitu-
tional under the Charter.26
Verdicts must always be unanimous.27  There is no provision, as in England
and Wales and some American states, for a majority verdict.28  The judge has
the discretion to poll the jury if there is any doubt that the verdict is not unani-
mous.  If the jury has difficulty in reaching unanimity, the judge may provide
some guidance on reasonable doubt, but a strong charge to reach unanimity
would be considered improper.  If the judge concludes that further deliberation
would be hopeless, the jury may be discharged and a new trial ordered.29
The form of the verdict is ordinarily a general verdict of guilty or not guilty.
The Criminal Code provides two exceptions.30  The first involves cases of de-
famatory libel where the judge may provide the jury a special verdict.  The sec-
ond involves instances of what used to be called the insanity defense but is now
called a “defense of mental disorder.”31  If a jury decides that the accused com-
mitted the act but was suffering from a mental disorder that exempts her from
criminal responsibility, it may render such a verdict.  In many cases, the jury
also has the option of returning a verdict finding the accused guilty of a lesser-
included offense.32
Sentencing the accused is the responsibility of the judge, not the jury.33  In
1976, Canada abolished the death penalty and substituted a mandatory life sen-
tence with no eligibility for parole for twenty-five years upon conviction of
first-degree murder, so jury recommendations are moot on this matter.34  How-
ever, in instances where an accused who is under the age of eighteen has been
found guilty of first- or second-degree murder, or an accused who is over the
age of eighteen at the time of the offense is found guilty of second-degree mur-
der, the judge must then tell the jury about the possible statutory range of the
sentence and ask if it wishes to make a recommendation.35  In the instance of an
                                                          
25. See id. § 644; see also GRANGER, supra note 9, at 190-98 (discussing the discharge of jurors).
26. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 197-98.
27. See id. at 281.
28. See Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Juries and Jury
Reform in England and Wales, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 36-37 (Spring 1999); King, supra note
2, at 46.
29. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 331.
30. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 16, 317 (1985) (Can.).  There appears to be no rule
against special verdicts, but they are only used in cases that fall within these two exceptions.
31. See id. § 16(1).
32. See id. § 317.
33. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 331.
34. However, after 15 years of a life sentence have been served, a convicted person may apply for
judicial review of the sentence.  If the Chief Justice of the province in which the conviction took place
decides a review is merited, a jury may be empanelled to hear the application and consider a reduction
in the sentence.  Two-thirds of the jury must agree for the sentence to be reduced.  See Criminal Code,
R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 745.6-745.64 (1985) (Can.); see also DAVID WATT & MICHELLE K. FUERST,
TREMEEAR’S CRIMINAL CODE 1195-1201 (commenting on these code sections).
35. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 745 (1985) (Can.); see also GRANGER, supra note 9, at
331-32 (commenting on this section); WATT & FUERST, supra note 34, at 1189-95 (same).
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adult found guilty of second-degree murder, for example, the judge must tell
the jury that the accused would ordinarily be eligible for parole after a manda-
tory ten-year imprisonment and ask the jury if it wants to make a recommenda-
tion as to the number of years between ten and twenty-five that the accused
should serve before being eligible for parole.  The jury does not have to make a
recommendation, and any such recommendation is not binding on the judge.
The Criminal Code is silent on whether the jury can be informed as to the pos-
sible sentence before the jury has reached a verdict in the case, but case law has
established that it is legal error to inform the jury about possible punishment
prior to its verdict on guilt for any charge, including second-degree murder.36
Several provincial courts have ruled that the recommendation does not have to
be unanimous.37  Finally, the jury’s power to decide guilt can be removed if, at
the end of the prosecution’s case, the judge decides that the Crown has not
produced a prima facie case for guilt.  In such an instance, the judge will enter a
directed verdict of not guilty.38
Although not too many years ago the typical Canadian jury consisted pri-
marily of white males selected by the local sheriff, the jury has become much
more representative of the population.  The selection of the jury list is con-
trolled by provincial statute, and the general rule in the provinces is that the list
is compiled by random selection from the electoral rolls in the province or local
community.39  Litigation based on an unrepresentative jury pool is sparse.
While the prosecution or defense may challenge the whole jury array at the
start of the trial on the grounds of fraud, partiality, or misconduct, such chal-
lenges have been infrequent.40  In R. v. Catizone41 and R. v. Nepoose,42 new ar-
rays were ordered when too few women appeared on the original arrays.  In R.
v. Nahdee,43 the accused successfully challenged the array because of irregulari-
ties in the selection of aboriginal persons, and in R. v. Born With A Tooth,44 the
Crown prevailed on a challenge to irregularities in the selection of aboriginal
citizens.  However, challenges to arrays on the grounds that they did not con-
tain a sufficient proportion of persons of a racial or ethnic group have tended to
fail if there were no irregularities in the selection process itself.  If the challenge
to the array is not made at the start of trial, section 670 of the Criminal Code
states that any irregularity in the summoning or empanelling of the jury shall
not be grounds for reversing a verdict.45  It is not clear how successful an appeal
                                                          
36. See WATT & FUERST, supra note 34, at 1189-95.
37. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 332.
38. See id. at 332-40.
39. See id at 81-142; see also TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 39-57 (discussing the selection of
jury lists from the Canadian provinces).
40. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 149-51.
41. [1972] 23 C.R.N.S. 44 (Ont. County Ct.).
42. [1988] 46 C.C.C.3d 421 (Alta. C.A.).
43. [1993] 26 C.R.4th 109 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
44. [1993] 81 C.C.C.3d 393 (Alta. Queen’s Bench).
45. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 670 (1985) (Can.).
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would be if strong evidence showing deliberate racial or gender biases in selec-
tion were produced after a conviction.
Statutory exemptions from jury service do restrict representativeness to
some degree.  Each province is responsible for the law on this matter and the
statutes differ somewhat across the provinces.  The most common exemptions
are for legislators, judges and other court employees, lawyers, and police offi-
cers, but some provinces also exempt doctors, veterinarians, firefighters, minis-
ters, and law students.46
C. Jury Selection
The jury selection process in the Bernardo trial is not typical of Canadian
jury practice and procedure.  In common practice, challenges for cause occur in
only a small percentage of criminal trials.  Most often, jurors are selected with-
out any questioning at all.  The trial judge may ask the assembled panel of pro-
spective jurors if any of them has health or other problems that would pose a
hardship and if anyone has a relationship with the parties or witnesses in the
case.  The judge may excuse such jurors.  The remaining jurors are then ran-
domly selected, and called one by one to face the accused.  At this point, the
Crown prosecutor and defense lawyer may exercise one of the peremptory
challenges that each side is allotted.  However, since no other information is
available, except in some provinces the juror’s occupation, the decision on a
peremptory is made solely on the basis of observable physical characteristics
and demeanor of the juror.47
The legal presumption behind this practice, as enunciated in a leading case
on jury law, R. v. Hubbert, is that a juror will “perform his duties in accordance
with his oath” and render a verdict with an impartial mind.48  Hubbert discussed
additional factors that bolster this presumption.  The jury is composed of
twelve persons who will deliberate and cancel any individual biases that exist.
Additionally, the judge’s instructions to the jury will have a salutary effect by
reminding the jurors that they have a solemn duty to be fair and impartial.49
Hubbert recognized the utility of the challenge for cause process in some
cases, but specifically expressed the view that Canadian jury selection proce-
dures should not develop along American lines.50  Hubbert was decided in 1975,
but the concern about “Americanizing” the Canadian jury continues to be ex-
pressed by members of the judiciary today51 as a consequence of a number of
decisions that have liberalized the standards under which challenges for cause
                                                          
46. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 83-142.
47. It is known, from the author’s professional knowledge from interviews with judges, defense
lawyers, and Crown attorneys, that the Crown frequently does search the list to determine if any jurors
have a criminal record.
48. [1975] 29 C.C.C.2d 279 (Ont. C.A.).
49. See id. at 296.
50. See id. at 291.
51. See Dagenais v. Canadian Broad. Corp. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 839 (Can.); R. v. Williams [1994]
30 C.R.4th 277, 283-85 (B.C.S.C.).
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should be allowed and the types of prejudices that have been legally recog-
nized.52  This article addresses this issue in some detail, but first it is important
to discuss how Canadian law attempts to prevent certain types of prejudices
from arising in the first place.
D. Balancing Free Press and Fair Trial
The Bernardo case introduced the delicate balancing act that the Canadian
legal system attempts to maintain between the values of a free press and a fair
trial.
This balancing involves the controls that the judiciary may place on the
mass media to prevent pretrial publicity.  England, with its severe contempt of
court laws for those reporting court proceedings, emphasizes the value of fair
trial over free press;53 the United States, with Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart54 and related cases, emphasizes the value of free press over fair trial.  In
contrast, Canada attempts to balance the two competing values.  Section 11(d)
of the Charter guarantees an accused the right “to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal,” and section 2(b) provides for “freedom of the press and
other media of communication.”55  The Criminal Code also declares the right to
a proceeding in open court.56  However, two sections of the Code place limits
on these rights.  Section 537 provides the judge with the power to exclude eve-
ryone but the prosecutor, the accused, and his counsel from the preliminary in-
quiry, ordinarily held for indictable offenses.57  Section 486 of the Code confers
the judge with authority to ban the public and press from all or part of criminal
trial proceedings if it is in the interest of public morals, the maintenance of or-
der, or the proper administration of justice.58  The apparent contradiction be-
tween these sections of the Code and the Charter guarantees are reconciled by
section 1 of the Charter, which declares that the rights and freedoms are not
absolute: “reasonable limits” may be “prescribed by law as can be demonstra-
bly justified in a free and democratic society.”59
In addition, section 539(1) of the Criminal Code provides that the accused
person has the right to ask for an order banning publication of the content of
the proceedings until the charges are dropped or the trial is ended.60  The mo-
tion must be granted; the judge has no discretion.  (The fact that the prelimi-
                                                          
52. See R. v. Sherratt [1991] 1 S.C.R. 509 (Can.); R. v. Parks [1993] 24 C.R.4th 81 (Ont. C.A.).
53. See JAMES GOBERT, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY, AND THE JURY (1997); S.H. Bailey, The Con-
tempt of Court Act 1981, 45 MOD. L. REV. 301 (1982); Clive Walker et al., The Reporting of Crown
Court Proceedings and the Contempt of Court Act 1981, 55 MOD. L. REV. 647 (1992).
54. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
55. Charter, supra note 14, §§ 2(b), 11(d).
56. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 486 (1985) (Can.).
57. See id. § 537.
58. See id. § 486.
59. Charter, supra note 14, § 1.
60. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 539(1) (1985) (Can.).
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nary inquiry has been held may be reported.)  Defendants frequently invoke
this right, particularly in cases likely to draw public interest.  Consequently, the
preliminary inquiry is seldom a source of prejudicial pretrial publicity.
Although the trial judge drew upon common law precedent to ban publica-
tion of the content of the Homolka trial proceedings until the termination of
the Bernardo trial, his order should be viewed in the context of the general
philosophy of the Criminal Code and the Charter, that is, to balance free ex-
pression with the right of the accused to a fair trial.  The philosophy was also
reflected in the Bernardo trial with respect to the judge’s decision to prohibit
both the public and the press from viewing the videotapes that were shown to
the jury.  Canadian trial practice does not allow sidebar conferences; the jury is
removed from the courtroom for all legal arguments.61  The Code proscribes
publication of anything said in the absence of the jury until the jury retires to
consider its verdict, at which time sequestration is mandatory.62  The ban does
not apply if the jury is sequestered during the whole trial, but sequestration is
extremely rare.63
Two other matters bear on the control of pretrial prejudice.  The first is that
cameras are not permitted in Canadian courtrooms.64  This inhibits inflamma-
tory publicity in sensational cases like Bernardo.  The second is that section 649
of the Criminal Code prohibits jurors from ever disclosing anything about their
deliberations under threat of a summary conviction that could result in a
maximum sentence of six months imprisonment and a fine of up to $5,000.65
This law, passed in 1972, has the effect of curtailing improper juror motivation.
Thus, the jurors in the Bernardo case were not tempted to lie about their lack
of impartiality in anticipation of a lucrative contract with a tabloid newspaper
or a book publisher at the trial’s end.  Fame and financial gain are not motives
for Canadian jurors.
The attempt to balance competing values of fair trial and free press has met
some difficult challenges in the face of Royal commissions of inquiry and mass
media saturation, and several of these cases merit further comment.  Canadian
political culture often encourages the use of formal public inquiries in impor-
tant matters that affect the public interest.  In 1995, the government of Nova
Scotia ordered an inquiry into a fatal underground explosion in the Westray
Coal Mine and granted its commissioner the power to compel testimony of wit-
nesses, including persons who might face criminal charges.  The affected wit-
nesses applied for a temporary stay of the public hearings on the ground that
the publicity would jeopardize their right to a fair trial.  Although the appeal
was argued on the ground that the accused would elect a trial by jury, they sub-
                                                          
61. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 213.
62. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 539(1) (1985) (Can.); see also WATT & FUERST, supra
note 34, at 854-55 (commenting on this section).
63. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 305-07.
64. See Daniel J. Henry, Electronic Public Access to Court: A Proposal for Its Implementation To-
day, in THE MEDIA, THE COURTS AND THE CHARTER, supra note 9, at 441.
65. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 649 (1985) (Can.).
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sequently elected trial by judge alone, thereby rendering the issue moot.  Nev-
ertheless, in Phillips v. Nova Scotia,66 the Supreme Court addressed the prob-
lem of pretrial publicity generated by public inquiries.  The court conceded that
publicizing evidence might “irreparably” prejudice jurors, but it emphasized
the importance of public interest in the inquiry and placed the burden of proof
on the accused to demonstrate the link between publicity and harm.  In the de-
cision, the Court stated:
The objective of finding 12 jurors who know nothing of the facts of a highly-
publicized case, is today, patently unrealistic. . . . [I]mpartiality cannot be equated
with ignorance of all facts of the case. . . .  [I]n order to hold a fair trial it must be pos-
sible to find jurors who, although familiar with the case, are able to discard any previ-
ously formed opinions and to embark upon their duties armed with both an assump-
tion that the accused is innocent until proven otherwise, and a willingness to
determine liability based solely on the evidence presented at trial.67
Phillips asserted that any remedy must be weighed against existing proce-
dural safeguards relating to jury prejudice (such as judicial instructions and
challenges for cause).68  Moreover, Phillips sanctioned temporary publication
bans of harmful testimony or the conclusions of the inquiry until completion of
the criminal proceedings.69
R. v. Kenny70 and R. v. Burke71 also involved a 1989 public inquiry involving
charges of obstruction of justice in the investigation of rampant sexual assaults
on boys in the Mt. Cashel Orphanage in Newfoundland by numerous members
of the Christian Brothers, a Catholic religious order, who were in charge of the
institution.  Despite defense motions to delay the inquiry until after the trials of
the accused or at least to place a ban on publication, the hearing took place and
was covered live on television.  The testimony was very graphic about what oc-
curred and who was involved.72  The problem was exacerbated by statements
prejudicial to the accused by public officials.  Additionally, the convictions of
the first members to stand trial received extensive media coverage in New-
foundland and across Canada.  Kenny, one of the accused, moved for a perma-
nent stay of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial pretrial publicity.  The
trial judge, while conceding that the publicity had prejudiced the community,
nevertheless concluded that the risk of bias could be neutralized by jury selec-
tion procedures and judicial instructions, and denied the motion.  Kenny then
elected trial by judge alone and was convicted.73  His appeal of the denial of the
                                                          
66. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97 (Can.).
67. Id. at 168.
68. See id. at 169.
69. See id.
70. [1996] 108 C.C.C.3d 349 (Nfld. C.A.).
71. [1994] 8 C.C.C.3d 257 (Nfld. C.A.).
72. See James R.P. Ogloff & Neil Vidmar, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors: A Study to
Compare the Relative Effects of Television and Print Media in a Child Sex Abuse Case, 18 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1994) (describing the testimony that appeared on television as well as a summary
of other background material about the case).
73. See Kenny [1996] 108 C.C.C.3d at 349.
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motion to stay was decided by the Supreme Court after Phillips and after
Burke.
Another case involving the balance of a fair trial and a free press was
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.74  Former and present members of a
Catholic religious order who ran an Ontario training school were charged with
multiple counts of sexual and physical abuse of young boys who were in their
care.  As their trial date approached, their defense lawyers applied for an in-
junction preventing the Canadian Broadcasting Company from airing a televi-
sion mini-series program, The Boys of St. Vincent, a fictional account based
upon Newfoundland’s Mt. Cashel Orphanage cases.  Relying on common law
authority, the trial judge granted a nationwide injunction on the airing of the
CBC series until after the Ontario trials were finished.  The Ontario Court of
Appeal upheld the injunction but limited its scope to Ontario and the city of
Montreal.75  Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court applied a balancing test
under section 1 of the Charter and quashed the injunction.76  The Dagenais de-
cision did not absolutely curb common law judicial authority on publication
bans, but it enunciated guidelines limiting the scope of such bans and requiring
the weighing of potential harms to free expression against some combination of
alternative remedial measures, such as adjourning trials, changing venues, se-
questering jurors, allowing challenges for cause, and providing strong judicial
direction to the jury.  The decision was based on a balancing of the salutary ef-
fects of a publication ban on the fairness of the trial against the deleterious ef-
fects delaying free expression guaranteed by section 2 of the Charter.  In fact,
Dagenais asserted that, unlike the American model of a clash between free
press and fair trial, section 1 of the Charter requires a balancing of values.  It
also noted that freedom of expression and the accused’s right to a fair trial are
not always in conflict, such as when public scrutiny of the court process may
protect the fairness of trials.  Finally, it noted that publication bans can also
protect the privacy of members affected by the trial and other interests.
Note that in Bernardo, Phillips, and Dagenais, the injunctions involved de-
lay, not permanent bans, on media publication or airing of stories.  Moreover,
Canadian law provides no proscription of news stories developed from sources
independent of court hearings.  The Homolka hearing’s status as a “trial” was
also ambiguous, and the ban on publication to protect the Bernardo trial might
not have prevailed if Homolka’s guilty plea and sentencing had occurred before
the jury trial.  As it was, the media engaged in much commentary regarding the
“leniency” of her sentence before and during Bernardo’s trial, even though
such commentary could taint public opinion.  Finally, it appears that in recent
years, the Supreme Court of Canada has increasingly relied on confidence in
“existing procedural safeguards” against jury prejudice in the face of media re-
                                                          
74. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (Can.).
75. See id. at 836.
76. See id.
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porting.77  This possibly results from the greater use of such procedural devices
as the challenge for cause, and the need to allow free expression under the
Charter.78  Those matters are discussed in the next part of this article, but the
important point is that the Canadian Supreme Court appears to be engaging in
a pragmatic search for a middle ground between the English and American sys-
tems regarding the free press/fair trial issue.
III
PRETRIAL PREJUDICE AND PROCEDURAL REMEDIES
Despite the presumption that jurors will follow their oath, and despite
measures intended to prevent or minimize tainting of jurors by the mass media,
Canadian law and practice recognize that some of the laypersons called to serve
as jurors may not have impartial minds regarding the guilt or innocence of the
accused.  Sometimes this is because the measures have proven ineffective and
sometimes this is because, as described below, the sources of potential preju-
dice arise from sources other than mass media.  A number of remedies in-
tended to constrain and guide the laypersons who form the jury to the rational
purposes of the law are provided.  During the 1990s, the courts have shifted the
emphasis placed on these remedies, but not without strong controversy
amongst the judiciary, the Crown, and the defense bar.  Before turning to these
issues, a brief discussion of legal prejudice, or partiality, is useful because it
sheds light on the recent developments in case law.
A. Forms of Prejudice
For purposes of conceptual analysis, potential juror prejudice may be di-
vided into four types.79  Interest prejudice, sometimes also called manifest or
“obvious” prejudice,80 involves jurors who may have a direct stake in the trial
outcome or at least whose presence would appear to be unfair to one of the
parties.  Thus, persons who have a direct familial, social, or economic relation-
ship with the accused, the victim, or witnesses, or who might be positively or
adversely affected by the outcome of the trial would be classified as having an
interest prejudice.  Interest prejudice may be inferred on the basis of the juror’s
connection to the trial without a specific assessment of his or her attitudes.
Specific prejudice exists when the juror holds attitudes or beliefs about the
specific case at trial that would prevent that person from deciding guilt or inno-
cence with an impartial mind.  These attitudes and beliefs could arise from per-
                                                          
77. See Phillips v. Nova Scotia [1995] 2 S.C.R. 97, 169 (Can.).
78. In 1998, new controversy developed over the frequency and extent to which judges are prone
to grant bans on publicity as a result of some controversial cases, but the matter has not been resolved
at the level of appeal courts.  See Brian Bergman, To Gag or Not to Gag, MACLEAN’S, Oct. 19, 1998, at
81.
79. See Neil Vidmar, Pretrial Prejudice in Canada: A Comparative Perspective on the Criminal
Jury, 79 JUDICATURE 249, 252 (1996).
80. R. v. Sherratt [1991] 1 S.C.R. 509, 534 (Can.).
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sonal knowledge about the case, publicity from the mass media, or informal
discussion and rumor about the case among members of the community.
Generic, or general, prejudice involves the transferring of attitudes or be-
liefs about the case or its participants as a result of the juror’s preexisting be-
liefs, or stereotyping, of the defendant, the victim/complainant, or the crime it-
self, such that the case is not decided impartially.81  As contrasted to specific
prejudice, knowledge about the case or the particular identities of the trial par-
ticipants is immaterial.  Rather, it is the perceived characteristics of the parties
or the crime itself that causes the juror to code the case as falling within a class
or category of cases in which the juror is inclined to lower the burden of proof
regarding guilt or to evaluate the evidence in a biased manner.  Racial or ethnic
prejudice is one of the oldest recognized forms of generic prejudice.  The per-
son is judged on the basis of his or her identity as a member of a group, rather
than on the specific facts brought out in the trial evidence.  There are research
findings indicating that the mere existence of charges of child sex abuse causes
some persons to infer that the accused is likely guilty.  Generic prejudice is not
mere abhorrence of the crime itself, but rather the inability to fairly decide
guilt on the basis of the trial evidence.
Finally, conformity prejudice exists when the juror perceives that there is
such strong community interest in a particular outcome of a trial that he or she
is influenced in reaching a verdict by the community’s feelings rather than an
impartial personal evaluation of the trial evidence.
While most psychologists would recognize all four of the above categories
as sources of potential prejudice, the central issues in jury law are if, when, and
under which circumstances a court will recognize them as legally cognizable
sources of partiality and which remedies to apply if the prejudice is acknowl-
edged.  Although not under the specific terminology applied here, all common
law jury systems appear to recognize interest, specific, and conformity preju-
dice.82  However, only a small number of common law jury systems appear to
recognize forms of generic prejudice per se.  At the end of the middle ages,
England appears to have recognized forms of generic prejudice with its provi-
sions for a jury de medietate linguae, where foreigners involved in civil or crimi-
nal litigation were entitled to a jury composed of six of their countrymen and
six Englishmen.83  United States case law and practice recognize racial and
other generic prejudices.
Canadian case law provides numerous attempts at definitions of juror parti-
ality, the most general of which is not being “indifferent between the Queen
                                                          
81. For additional elaboration of generic prejudice, see Neil Vidmar, Generic Prejudice and the
Presumption of Guilt in Sex Abuse Trials, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5 (1997).
82. See GERTNER & MIZNER, supra note 8, at 3-9 to 3-17; Gary Knapp, Annotation, Scope of Voir
Dire Examination, 114 L.Ed.2d 763 (1995).
83. See, e.g., MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994) (discussing early English
practice).
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and the accused.”84  However, in the leading case, R. v. Parks,85 decided by the
Ontario Court of Appeal (and subsequently refused leave to appeal by the Su-
preme Court86) the definition was articulated in precise form:
Partiality has both an attitudinal and behavioural component.  It refers to one who
has certain preconceived biases, and who will allow those biases to affect his or her
verdict despite the trial safeguards designed to prevent reliance on those biases.  A
partial juror is one who is biased and will discriminate against one of the parties to the
litigation based on that bias.87
This definition is broad enough to encompass all four types of prejudice de-
scribed above.  And, indeed, the very recent Supreme Court case of R. v. Wil-
liams88 recognized all four types of prejudice, though without coming to grips
with limits to the scope of generic prejudice.  However, as will be described
below, the issue of generic prejudice has been a significant source of contro-
versy within the Canadian legal system.
B. Remedies for Prejudice
The Criminal Code and Canadian case law provide a number of remedies
for juror prejudices, or partiality.  In addition to adjournments of proceedings,
these are judicial instructions, peremptory challenges, challenges for cause,
changes of venue, and trial by judge alone.89
1.  Judicial Instructions.  As already discussed, Canadian courts have
expressed a strong belief in the power of judicial instructions to guide jurors to
be fair and impartial.  This presumption was stated in Hubbert, but enunciated
even more strongly in R. v. Corbett,90 a case involving the issue of whether prior
convictions of the accused could be introduced in evidence bearing on
character if the accused chose to testify.  Rejecting social science research that
indicated that jurors were influenced by knowledge of criminal records, Corbett
asserted confidence in the experience of trial judges that firm instructions from
the judge caused juries to perform their duties according to the law.91  The
reasoning of Corbett was specifically applied to pretrial publicity in Dagenais,
with the caveat that judicial instructions were not invariably efficacious in
eliminating the effects of pretrial publicity.92
                                                          
84. R. v. Hubbert [1995] 29 C.C.C.2d 279, 286 (Ont. C.A.).
85. [1993] 24 C.R.4th 81 (Ont. C.A.).
86. [1994] 1 S.C.R. x (Can.).
87. Parks [1993] 24 C.R.4th at 93.
88. [1998] 159 D.L.R.4th 493 (Can.).
89. See Dagenais v. Canadian Broad. Corp. [1994] 3 S.C.R.835 (Can.).  Dagenais makes reference
to the remedy of adjournment of the trial until the effects of publicity have abated.  Adjournments are
authorized under § 645 of the Criminal Code and are under the discretion of the trial judge.  However,
the case law on adjournments for pretrial publicity is sparse and largely noncontroversial.  I will not
discuss it further here.
90. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, 695 (Can.).
91. See id.
92. See Dagenais [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 885.
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2.  Peremptory Challenges and Stand-Asides.  Following the traditions of
common law and the underlying rationale, the peremptory challenge remains a
part of Canadian law.93  In cases involving treason or murder, both the
prosecutor and the accused are entitled to twenty peremptories.  For offenses
in which the accused may be sentenced to more than five years in prison, both
sides have twelve peremptory challenges, and for other offenses each side has
four.  In joint trials, each co-accused has the same number of peremptory
challenges as if he or she were tried alone.  The purposes of the peremptory
challenge are recognized as the same as those articulated by Blackstone, who
has been favorably quoted on the issue.94  It provides a perception of trial
fairness to the accused to be able to eliminate persons with whom the accused
has an uncomfortable feeling, no matter what the basis behind the impression
of the prospective juror.  Additionally, in instances in which there is suspicion
about the venireman’s professed indifference to the matters at the bar, but
there are not sufficient grounds to eliminate the person for cause, the
peremptory provides a mechanism to do so.
Prior to 1992, the Crown also had the right to “stand-aside” (also called
“stand-by”) up to forty-eight jurors with no reasons given.  The stand-aside
procedure was adopted from English practice in the Criminal Code of 1892.
Originally the number of stand-asides was unlimited, but in 1917 the number
was reduced to forty-eight.95  The rationale for the stand-aside was the same as
in English law, namely to allow the Crown to eliminate jurors deemed unfit or
hostile to the Crown.  However, in 1992 in R. v. Bain, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that stand-asides violated the Charter because a reasonable person
would conclude that it provided the Crown with an unfair advantage over the
accused.96  Subsequently, Parliament amended the Criminal Code and abol-
ished stand-asides, but it simultaneously gave the Crown the same number of
peremptories as the accused.97
With the exception of the stand-aside, peremptory challenges have not been
controversial as they have been in England or the United States.98  There are
probably a number of reasons, including such factors as tighter controls in Can-
ada on the trial process, lack of extensive pretrial questioning of jurors, rarity
bordering on a near absence of in-court jury selection experts, and the fact that
legal issues of jury representativeness per se are minimized by case law and the
Criminal Code.  However, R. v. Biddle99 deserves brief comment because it can
                                                          
93. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 634 (1985) (Can.).
94. See R. v. Bain [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91, 152 (Can.) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *353).
95. See id. at 109.
96. See id. at 105.
97. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 144-45.  When multiple defendants are involved in a trial, each
has the allotted number of peremptories, but the Crown’s number of peremptories are not increased.
See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 634 (1985) (Can.).
98. See Lloyd-Bostock & Thomas, supra note 28, at 23-27.
99. [1995] 1 S.C.R. 761 (Can.).
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be compared with the U.S. case of J.E.B. v. Alabama,100 which forbids the use of
gender-based peremptories.  Biddle was convicted by an all-female jury of two
1986 rapes, largely on the basis of contested eyewitness identification evidence.
The Crown had exercised its stand-by privileges to eliminate male jurors.  Bid-
dle’s conviction was overturned on other grounds and since Bain had subse-
quently ruled the stand-by unconstitutional, the question of the all-female jury
was only academic.  However, in a concurring opinion, one justice commented
that “[w]hile representativeness is not an essential quality on the jury,” it is a
“characteristic which furthers the perception of impartiality.”101  Consequently,
the prosecution’s “apparent attempt” to modify the jury’s composition under-
mined jury impartiality.102  However, in opinions that concurred with overturn-
ing the conviction, two justices disagreed with this assessment, with one stating:
I agree that a jury must be impartial and competent.  But, with respect, the law has
never suggested that a jury must be representative.  For hundreds of years, juries in
this country were composed entirely of men.  Are we to say that all these juries were
for that reason partial and incompetent?103
In short, it is not clear how the Supreme Court would rule in a case in which
one side exercised its peremptories to systematically eliminate jurors on the ba-
sis of gender or race.
3.  Challenges for Cause.  In contrast to peremptory challenges, challenges
for cause have evoked considerable legal controversy within the past decade.104
They have occurred with greater frequency than in the past, and both trial and
appellate judges have disagreed on the scope of permissible grounds of these
challenges, as well as on the scope of the permissible questions.105  Courts in
Ontario have allowed challenges for cause with greater frequency than in other
provinces.  Judges in other provinces have either actively resisted challenges for
cause, or the matter has seldom arisen, at least in reported case law.106
As a first matter, attention needs to be drawn to the fact, alluded to earlier,
that the Canadian judge does not have the power to dismiss individual jurors
from the array on the grounds of prejudice.107  The judge is allowed to dismiss
some persons if he or she determines in open court that the juror has a personal
interest in the matter to be tried, has a relationship with the judge or any of the
parties or witnesses to the suit, or would suffer personal hardship or suffers
                                                          
100. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
101. Biddle [1995] 1 S.C.R. at 788.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Austin M. Cooper, The ABCs of Challenge for Cause in Jury Trials: To Challenge or Not to
Challenge and What to Ask If You Get It, 37 CRIM. L.Q. 62 (1994); David M. Tanovich, Rethinking
Jury Selection: Challenges for Cause and Peremptory Challenges, [1994] 30 C.R.4th 310; David Pa-
ciocco, Challenges for Cause: Cameron and Sexual Offence Cases (Apr. 1995) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author); Steven Skurka, Challenge for Cause: Questions Allowed Since R. v. Parks
(Nov. 11, 1994) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
105. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 158-88.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 187-88; TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 81-83, 161.
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from a disability.108  However, the Code states that two lay triers shall decide
the issue of impartiality of a challenged juror.109  The challenge process pro-
ceeds in the manner described in the Bernardo trial.110  Two laypersons are ran-
domly chosen to serve as a mini-jury to render a verdict on the impartiality of
the challenged juror.  After the first impartial juror is chosen, he or she be-
comes a trier for the next juror, and the process of selection and trier replace-
ment with a newly selected juror continues until a jury of twelve is selected.
Ordinarily, the jury panel is removed from the courtroom for the challenging
process on the theory that observing the process may affect their answers.111
The trial judge, however, plays a crucial role in determining whether a
challenge shall be allowed and the form of the questions that may be put to the
jurors.112  Since there is a legal presumption that a juror is impartial, the burden
of proof for overcoming this presumption lies with the party requesting the
challenge.  In practice, this is almost always the accused.  The standard of proof
is low, namely proof of an “air of reality” or a “realistic potential.”113  The evi-
dence introduced in support of a challenge has involved newspaper articles, tes-
timony by persons knowledgeable of the community, and expert opinion by so-
cial scientists, sometimes buttressed with a public opinion survey designed
specifically for the case.114  In recent years, a number of judges have taken judi-
cial notice of the existence of forms of prejudice in permitting challenges for
cause.  As will be described below, for certain cases where the race of the par-
ties might be an issue, recent case law has asserted that the accused need only
present a prima facie case to challenge on grounds of potential racial bias.
However, even though the standard of proof is low, the costs of producing evi-
dence serves to inhibit requests for challenges for cause in many cases.
The judge is charged with keeping a tight rein on the forms of questions that
may be asked of jurors.  In response to concerns about “American-style” voir
dire, Hubbert asserted that “[c]hallenge for cause is not for the purpose of
finding out what kind of juror the person called is likely to be—his personality,
beliefs, prejudices, likes or dislikes.”115  Typically, the questions put to jurors
are limited in number, often only one or two, and require only yes or no an-
swers.  Usually the questions are written out in advance and approved by the
judge.  The questions must directly address the juror’s state of mind.  The law-
yer for the side that requests the challenge asks the questions.
In R. v. Parks, the jurors were asked:
                                                          
108. See TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 77-83.
109. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 640 (1985) (Can.).
110. See TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 151-64.
111. See id. at 165.
112. See id. at 84-106.
113. See id. at 95-100.
114. See id. at 137-47; Vidmar & Melnitzer, supra note 10, at 491-93.
115. R. v. Hubbert [1975] 29 C.C.C.2d 279, 289 (Ont. C.A.).
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As the judge will tell you, in deciding whether or not the prosecution has proven the
charge against an accused a juror must judge the evidence of the witnesses without
bias, prejudice or partiality:
(1) In spite of the judge’s direction would your ability to judge witnesses without
bias, prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact that there are people involved in
cocaine and other drugs?[116]
(2) Would your ability to judge the evidence in the case without bias, prejudice or
partiality be affected by the fact that the person charged is a black Jamaican immi-
grant and the deceased is a white man?117
In R. v. Cameron, the judge allowed the following question:
As His Honor will instruct you, in deciding whether or not the prosecution has proven
the charge against an accused, a juror must judge the evidence of all the witnesses,
both for the Crown and for the defence, without bias, prejudice, or partiality.
In spite of His Honour’s direction, would your ability to judge the accused with-
out bias, prejudice or partiality be affected by the fact that he was selling cocaine on
the day in question?118
Most often, the judge does not allow further exploration of the juror’s rea-
soning behind the answer.  The triers make their decision based on the juror’s
yes or no answer about whether he or she can be fair and impartial.  In practice,
this process of jury selection typically consumes about two hours of trial time.
In cases involving pretrial publicity, the judge may permit additional ques-
tions.  In R. v. Lesso,119 the judge allowed the following questions:  Have you
discussed the case with anyone?  If yes, have you expressed an opinion about
the guilt or innocence of the accused?  If no, do you have an opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused?  If yes, what is that opinion?  In a Prince
Edward Island case, R. v. Cameron,120 involving a doctor in a small community
accused of sexually assaulting his patients, the jurors were asked up to five
questions: whether they had been a patient or had some other relationship with
the accused; whether they knew and had attitudes or beliefs about trial wit-
nesses that would cause them to give the testimony of those witnesses more or
less credibility than other witnesses; whether they had discussed and formed an
opinion about the case; whether they had strong beliefs about sexual assault
that would prevent them from being impartial; and whether they had any other
beliefs about the case or about sexual assault in general that would prevent
them from being impartial.
In most cases, judges have held that it is inappropriate to ask jurors whether
they are members of a particular race or class of society, about their personal
experiences such as whether the juror or a member of the juror’s family has
been the victim of an offense, and what the prospective juror’s beliefs are, in-
                                                          
116. The judge was ruled in error for having permitted this question.  See [1993] 24 C.R.4th 81, 88
(Ont. C.A.).
117. Id.
118. [1995] 96 C.C.C.3d 346, 348 (Ont. C.A.).
119. [1973] 23 C.R.N.S.179, 187-91 (Ont. H.C.J.).
120. No. GSC-13385 (P.E.I.S.C. (Trial Div.) Apr. 15, 1994).
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cluding whether they belong to any groups, such as a victim support group, or
fraternize with particular ethnic or racial groups.121
The limited questioning allowed in challenges for cause renders it an imper-
fect device for ferreting out prejudice since the juror might not understand the
question and typically is required to answer only yes or no.  However, in actual
experience with challenges for cause, a number of jurors do affirm that they are
not impartial and are rejected by the triers.122  Additionally, the process of ask-
ing the juror if he or she can be impartial is believed to reinforce the judge’s
admonition at trial of the need to be fair and impartial.123  Thus, Canadian jury
law may again be seen as seeking a middle ground between the extensive, intru-
sive and occasionally time-consuming American voir dire and the near refusal
of English law to recognize that some jurors may not be “impartial between the
Queen and the accused.”
The primary controversy regarding challenges for cause has involved forms
of generic prejudice.  Since the mid-1970s, a number of trial judges in Toronto,
Ontario have taken cognizance of the existence of racial prejudice in that city
and allowed challenges regarding whether jurors held racial prejudice.124  In R.
v. Parks, the Ontario Court of Appeal took judicial notice of the fact that  “[a]
significant segment of our community holds overtly racist views” and indicated
that the black person accused of second-degree murder involving a drug trans-
action should have had the right to challenge jurors on their impartiality with-
out the need to demonstrate actual prejudice.125  The reasoning of the Parks de-
cision was subsequently extended to cases outside of Toronto and to cases
involving important witnesses who were members of that minority group.126
Subsequently, in British Columbia an aboriginal (Canadian Indian) defen-
dant facing charges of robbery, requested a challenge for cause involving racial
bias.  In the resulting case of R. v. Williams, both the trial judge127 and the Brit-
ish Columbia Court of Appeal128 denied the motion.  The judges acknowledged
that there was widespread prejudice against aboriginal people in the commu-
nity, but asserted there was no evidence that there was a nexus between the
prejudice and the ability of jurors to decide the case impartially if properly in-
structed by the trial judge.  The British Columbia courts also attempted to dis-
                                                          
121. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 181-86; TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 147-50.
122. See Vidmar & Melnitzer, supra note 10, at 50; Vidmar, supra note 81, tbl.1; Neil Vidmar, So-
cial Science and Jury Selection, in LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
LITIGATION PROCESS 100, 125 (1976) (discussing the unreported case of R. v. Doxtator).
123. See R. v. Koh [1998] Nos. C25944, C27462, 1998 Ont. C.A. LEXIS 859, *29 (Ont. C.A. Dec. 30,
1998).
124. See Vidmar & Melnitzer, supra note 10, at 488.
125. [1993] 24 C.R.4th 81, 99 (Ont. C.A.).
126. See R. v. Willis [1994] 90 C.C.C.3d 350 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Morgan [1995] 42 C.R.4th 126 (Ont.
Gen. Div.); see also TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 110-11 (discussing challenges for cause based
on racial bias).
127. [1994] 30 C.R.4th 277 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
128. [1996] 106 C.C.C.3d 215 (B.C.C.A.).
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tinguish the case from Parks.  The case was appealed, and in R. v. Williams,129
the Supreme Court in a unanimous nine-zero decision ruled that the challenge
should have been allowed and directed a new trial.  The Court recognized ge-
neric prejudices beyond just racial prejudice and their potential influences on
jurors, while still asserting the trial judge’s discretion to decide the merits of
challenges for cause on a case-by-case basis.
Both before and after Parks, individual trial judges have allowed challenges
for cause bearing on other types of generic prejudice.130  These have included
prejudices involving other racial groups, homosexuality, HIV status, offenses
involving domestic violence, violence against women, elderly persons, and the
police, and drug offenses, particularly when the drug charges were intertwined
with racial issues.  In addition, in a substantial number of Ontario cases, trial
judges have allowed challenges in cases involving sexual offenses against chil-
dren.131  Despite a substantial number of documented cases in which jurors ad-
mitted to not being impartial when an accused was charged with sexual abuse,132
in R. v. Betker,133 the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that challenges based on
this type of offense were inappropriate.  The reasoning of the Court involved
complicated issues that are beyond the scope of this overview of Canadian law.
However, following the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Williams, the issue of
offense-based challenges has been re-opened and a number of such challenges
have been allowed by Ontario trial judges.134
It is reasonable to conclude that the challenge for cause is a procedural
remedy that is in a state of change and development.  Although the various ap-
peal court decisions have stated that the law as defined in Hubbert has not
changed, the empirical result in Ontario has been a substantial expansion of the
right to challenge for cause, accompanied with a partial retrenchment regarding
sexual offense-based challenges.  The Parks case and its progeny and the Wil-
liams decision are at once a recognition of changing social conditions in Canada
and an attempt to provide a remedy to foster the legal goal of a fair trial and
public perceptions of fairness.  Lawyers and judges in other provinces have
been more conservative regarding the use of the challenge for cause, continuing
to rely more heavily on the presumption that a juror will be impartial.  The
Williams decision, however, will surely result in more frequent challenges when
the accused is a member of a minority group.135  Whether there will be spill-
over effects regarding other forms of pretrial prejudice or other developments
cannot be foretold at the present time.
                                                          
129. [1998] 159 D.L.R.4th 493 (Can.).
130. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 178-81; TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 115-37.
131. See TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 119-24; Vidmar, supra note 81, tbl.1.
132. See TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 119-94; Vidmar, supra note 81, tbl.1.
133. [1997] 115 C.C.C.3d 421 (Ont. C.A.).
134. This conclusion is based on personal conversations with Professor David Paciocco.
135. In R. v. Koh [1998] Nos. C25944, C27462, 1998 Ont. C.A. LEXIS 859 (Ont. C.A. Dec. 30,
1998), a case involving charges of narcotics trafficking, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that racism
was not unique or indigenous against blacks and extended to persons of Asian/Chinese origin.  Koh
expanded the right to challenge elaborated in Parks to accused who are “minorities of colour.”
VIDMAR.FMT.DOC 08/02/99  4:04 PM
164 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 2
4.  Changes of Venue.  The basic rule at common law was that the trial
should be heard in the community in which the crime occurred, and that is still
the presumption in Canada.  However, the Code provides that either the
accused or the prosecutor may apply for a change of venue if “it appears
expedient to the ends of justice.”136  This could mean convenience to the parties
or other matters, but is also interpreted to include situations where substantial
segments of the community are believed to be so tainted by pretrial prejudice
that a fair trial cannot be held.  The standard for moving a trial has been a
showing that there is a “fair and reasonable probability of partiality or
prejudice.”137  Most authority seems to indicate that change of venue is a more
extreme remedy than a challenge for cause.138
The nature of proof tendered by the applicant is similar to that in a chal-
lenge for cause application.  It may be documentary evidence, viva voce evi-
dence, or expert testimony.  In a number of cases, a basis of the expert’s testi-
mony has been a public opinion poll carried out in the relevant community and
sometimes in comparison communities.139
5.  Trial by Judge Alone.  Recall that there are some crimes, including
murder, in which the Code specifies that the accused must be tried by judge and
jury.140  The Code indicates that this may be changed to judge alone only with
the consent of both the accused and the Crown.141  In R. v. McGregor,142 the
accused was charged with killing his estranged wife with a cross-bow on the
street near the Parliament buildings in Ottawa.  The killing occurred on the
first anniversary of the mass killings of a number of female engineering
students in the City of Montreal.  There was a great deal of publicity about the
killing and its relation to the “Montreal Massacre.”  The accused chose to plead
not guilty by reason of insanity and wished to be tried by judge alone.  The
Crown would not consent, arguing that a change of venue was the appropriate
remedy.  Counsel for McGregor introduced survey data through two experts
who indicated that there was not only extremely high prejudice in the
community but that there was also substantial generic and specific evidence of
lack of impartiality toward the insanity defense.  However, the survey data also
indicated that generic prejudice against the insanity defense would likely be
substantial in the county to which the Crown proposed moving the trial,
thereby raising the possibility that a challenge for cause would be required even
if the trial was moved.  In addition, defense counsel made other arguments,
                                                          
136. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 599 (1985) (Can.).
137. GRANGER, supra note 9, at 61.
138. See id. at 57-78.
139. See R. v. Theberge [1995] No. 2666-90 1995 Ont. C.A. LEXIS 1206 (Ont. Gen. Div. Mar. 16,
1995); Neil Vidmar & John W.T. Judson, The Use of Social Science Data in a Change of Venue Appli-
cation: A Case Study, 59 CANADIAN B. REV. 76 (1981).
140. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 471 (1985) (Can.).
141. See id. § 473.
142. [1992] 14 C.R.R.2d 155 (Ont. Gen. Div.); see also TANOVICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 29-32
(discussing the judge versus jury issue).
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such as the need for access to Ottawa-based psychiatric consultants during the
trial.  Relying on section 24(1) of the Charter, which provides for a court to
provide a remedy if any accused rights are in jeopardy of being infringed, the
court granted trial by judge alone.
IV
CONTROLS ON THE REST OF THE TRIAL PROCESS
The Canadian presumption about jurors following their oath and the tightly
restricted questioning process when challenges for cause are allowed needs to
be viewed in the context of the whole jury system.  Not only does Canadian law
attempt to control factors that might engender pretrial prejudice, it also pro-
vides for greater control over the jury than does the American system.  In fact,
in this regard, it bears greater similarity to the jury systems of England, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand.
A. Duties of the Trial Judge
The Canadian trial judge has limited discretion to summon witnesses who
are not called by either the prosecutor or the defense if he or she determines
that it is necessary to the “ends of justice.”143  The exercise of this power does
not require the consent of the parties.  The power must be used sparingly and is
regularly exercised.  The judge also has a positive duty to put questions to a
witness in order to clarify an obscure answer, a misunderstanding of a question
put to the witness, or an omission by legal counsel of a question that the judge
believes is relevant to the issues in the case.144  It is improper for either the
Crown prosecutor or defense counsel to offer any personal opinions about the
evidence or for the defense lawyer to invite the jury to ignore the law.145
Equally important, after the evidence and final arguments have been given,
the trial judge has the positive duty of reviewing the case for the jury.146  The
judge must impartially, but substantially, review the theories of the prosecution
and the defense and the evidence presented by both sides.  Moreover, the judge
is entitled to express an opinion to the jury about the importance of various
pieces of evidence and may even offer an opinion regarding the credibility of a
witness.  In undertaking this commentary, the judge must make it clear that the
jury is not bound to accept her opinion regarding the facts.  The judge also has
the obligation of raising any questions arising from the evidence that favor the
accused even if they were not raised by the accused’s legal counsel.  The jury
also must be instructed on reasonable doubt and the unanimity requirement.
The judge may provide the jury with a written description of the different ver-
                                                          
143. See GRANGER, supra note 9, at 216-19.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 221-41.
146. See id. at 243-304.
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dicts open to it but may not ask the jury to particularize the basis of its verdict;
only a general verdict is considered to be proper.
Canadian legal thinking regards this judicial guidance to the jury as signifi-
cant in the mitigation of any prejudices held by members of the jury.  This is a
large, though implicit, factor in the presumption that jurors will follow their
oath to be impartial.  It is also important in the belief that even when chal-
lenges for cause are allowed, the limitations of the highly circumscribed ques-
tioning process are capable of being offset by the intervention and guidance of
the judge.
B. Expert Evidence
The issue of the reliability and utility of expert evidence has engendered
concern in Canada147 as it has in the United States and other countries.148  The
concerns have focused around forensic evidence from the natural sciences such
as DNA tests, fiber samples, and explosive residue.  However, Canada has also
seen an increase in testimony involving the behavioral sciences.  In R. v.
Lavalee,149 involving a woman accused of killing her partner, the Supreme
Court approved the admissibility of testimony about “Battered Woman Syn-
drome.”  In other cases, evidence has been tendered about the “Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,” reliability of eyewitness identification, and
other social science evidence.150  Issues have been raised about the validity and
reliability of some of the expert evidence and upon its impact on the jury.151
Roughly similar to the U.S. cases of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc.152 and General Electric Co. v. Joiner,153 in R. v. Mohan154 the Supreme
Court of Canada enunciated a number of criteria for determining the admissi-
bility of expert evidence.  Mohan stated that not only must such evidence be
logically related to a fact in issue, it must also meet a threshold of reliability be-
yond the qualification of the expert.  Additionally, when the testimony engages
a novel scientific theory or technique, it should be subject to special scrutiny.
Mohan was intended to draw the judge’s attention to his or her responsibility to
screen expert evidence allowed in court.  An important goal of the Mohan deci-
sion was to prevent juries from being influenced by unreliable expert evidence
                                                          
147. See P. Brad Limpert, Beyond the Rule in Mohan: A New Model for Assessing the Reliability of
Scientific Evidence, 54 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 65 (1996); David M. Paciocco, Expert Evidence:
Where Are We Now? Where Are We Going? (Jan. 31, 1998) (unpublished manuscript presented at
Canadian Bar Association 1998 Institute of Continuing Legal Education) (on file with author).
148. See DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY (1997); Sophia I. Gatowski et al., The Diffusion of Scientific Evidence: A Com-
parative Analysis of Admissibility Standards in Australia, Canada, England, and the United States, and
Their Impact on the Social and Behavioural Sciences, 1996 EXPERT EVIDENCE 86.
149. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.).
150. See Paciocco, supra note 147, at 14.
151. See id. at 33.
152. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
153. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
154. [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9 (Can.).
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while still permitting new and novel evidence if it was relevant.155  Subse-
quently, in R. v. Olscamp,156 testimony about Child Sexual Abuse Accommoda-
tion Syndrome was ruled inadmissible and in another case, R. v. McIntosh,157
expert evidence bearing on eyewitness reliability was excluded.  Questions are
also being raised about evidence derived from the natural sciences.  However,
as commentators have pointed out, Canadian courts have been inconsistent in
applying the Mohan criteria from case to case.158  Thus, Mohan set the stage for
a control on what juries see and hear, but systematic application of these con-
trols is in a developmental stage.
C. Crown Appeal of an Acquittal
It would be remiss to fail to mention a striking feature of Canadian law.
While the Charter gives great weight to the presumption of innocence, the
Crown does have a limited right to appeal a jury acquittal.  The Code provides
that the Attorney General has the right to appeal a verdict of acquittal or a
verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.159  The
grounds for an appeal must involve an issue of law, such as a claim that the jury
was not properly instructed on the law.  This limitation on double jeopardy re-
quires a thorough review by appeal courts, but on occasion, the Crown has been
successful in obtaining a new trial.  In 1986, in a highly publicized case, Guy
Paul Morin was found not guilty of the murder of nine-year-old Christine Jes-
sup.160  His primary defense was an alibi defense but this was complicated by
psychiatric testimony that Morin was suffering from severe schizophrenia such
that if he did commit the crime, he would not have appreciated the nature and
quality of the act.  The Ontario Attorney General filed an appeal on the
grounds that the judge misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt and that it had
been improperly instructed about Morin’s psychiatric condition.  The Ontario
Court of Appeal reversed the verdict and ordered a new trial.161  The Supreme
Court of Canada upheld the reversal with respect to the reasonable doubt in-
struction.162  In his second trial, the issue of schizophrenia was abandoned but
the alibi defense was expanded.  Despite new evidence of serious police misbe-
havior, unreliable witnesses, and demonstration of unreliable forensic conclu-
sions regarding hair and fiber samples, after nine months of trial testimony, the
jury found Morin guilty of first-degree murder following a week of delibera-
tions.  Morin appealed, but while the appeal was pending DNA evidence that
                                                          
155. See Paciocco, supra note 147, at 8-15.
156. [1994] 35 C.R.4th 37 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
157. [1997] 35 O.R.3d 97 (Ont. C.A.).
158. See Limpert, supra note 147, at 83.
159. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 676 (1985) (Can.).
160. See R. v. Morin [1987] 36 C.C.C.3d 50 (Ont. C.A.).  For a synopsis of the Morin case from be-
ginning to end, see Jack King, The Ordeal of Guy Paul Morin: Canada Copes with Systemic Injustice,
CHAMPION, Aug. 1998, at 8.
161. See R. v. Morin [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345, 351 (Can.).
162. See id. at 361.
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had not been available during the first two trials eliminated Morin as the killer
and his conviction was set aside.  A subsequent public inquiry into justice sys-
tem failures resulted in the lengthy 1998 Kaufman Report that made many rec-
ommendations regarding criminal procedure and the jury system.163  The impact
of the Kaufman Report cannot yet be assessed.
The Morin case follows by more than two decades a change in Canadian
law, known as the Morgentaler Amendment,164 that had allowed an appeals
court to actually substitute a verdict of guilty despite a jury finding of not
guilty.  The Code now only allows ordering a new trial based on matters of
law.165  The jury is the sole interpreter of the facts.  Nevertheless, even with
these restrictions, section 676, as Morin demonstrates, is another judicial con-
straint on the jury.
D. Some Other Constraints
There are a few other factors bearing on the jury system that deserve brief
mention.  The rules of lawyer behavior outside the courtroom before, during,
and after the trial are in marked contrast to those in the United States and
more in line with the practice in other common law countries.  A lawyer hold-
ing press conferences to discuss the evidence, the judge, or anything that could
affect the trial or by innuendo bring the administration of justice into disrepute
would likely face serious contempt of court charges, censure from colleagues,
or, more likely, both.  Indeed, the legal culture is such that even a lawyer hav-
ing no connection to a case would be unlikely to offer highly evaluative com-
mentary to the media about the conduct of the case or the witnesses, as fre-
quently occurs in the United States.  Partly because of this legal culture and
partly because of the severe limitations on the jury selection process, in-court
jury trial consultants have rarely been employed.166  Under procedural rules, the
Crown is required to disclose its witnesses and evidence in advance of trial, but
the defense is not under a similar obligation.167  This may help to foster a more
constrained atmosphere, especially on the part of defense lawyers.  Inside the
superior courts, lawyers wear black vests and gowns inherited from English
tradition (the wigs are, mercifully, absent) and follow formal rules of decorum.
Opposing lawyers sit at a counsel table or stand at a lectern during the trial.
                                                          
163. FRED KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN:
REPORT (1998).
164. Morgentaler, a doctor crusading for abortion rights, was found not guilty of performing an
abortion after admitting to all of the elements of the charge but arguing an affirmative defense of ne-
cessity.  The Quebec Court of Appeal overturned the jury acquittal and substituted a conviction, based
on the trial evidence.  However, the public outcry caused Parliament to amend the Criminal Code in
1975 so that while an acquittal can still be appealed, the court can only order a new trial.  The details
of the trial, appeal, and change in law are described in F.L. MORTON, MORGANTALER V. BOROWSKI:
ABORTION, THE CHARTER, AND THE COURTS (1995).
165. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 676 (1985) (Can.).
166. There have been some instances, including several cases in which the present author partici-
pated in a low-key manner.
167. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 603 (1985) (Can.); see also WATT & FUERST, supra note
34, at 920-26 (discussing disclosure requirements under § 603).
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They can approach a witness only with permission of the judge.  Addresses to
the jury at the beginning and end of the trial are made from the lectern.168  Spe-
cial deference is given to the judge, who until recent years was always ad-
dressed as Your Lordship or Ladyship, but the prescriptive norms also extend
to the forms of address between the lawyers.  For instance, even when hotly
disputing a legal point, the adversaries frequently refer to their opponent as
“my friend.”  It is not an easily measurable phenomenon, but the atmosphere
of the Canadian courtroom surely must have an impact on the jurors.
V
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE JURY SYSTEM
The Inuit, or Eskimo people as they were then known, were first introduced
to the Canadian jury system in 1916 in what Edwin Keedy, who was present at
the proceedings, aptly labeled a “remarkable murder trial.”169  Two priests
working among the Inuit people, who were still largely isolated from Western
culture, went missing.  After a long hunt, a party of the Northwest Mounted
Police (later the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) uncovered the fact that two
Inuit men, Sinisiak and Uluksak, had killed the priests near the Coppermine
River.  The two Inuit admitted the acts, and they were transported 2,000 miles
south to Edmonton, Alberta, along with two interpreters and an elderly Inuit
who was to be a witness.  Sinisiak was appointed legal counsel and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Alberta conducted his trial for murder of one
of the priests.  Although the trial took place in summer, in the first stage the
two accused were dressed in their native dress, with a tub full of water and ice
provided to soak their feet and help them stay cool.  Through translators, the
Inuit admitted the act of which they were accused, but testified that the priests
had abused them and, moreover, created in their minds the belief that the
priests were going to kill them.  In fact, the Inuit subsequently ate pieces of the
priests’ liver as a protection against their evil spirits.  At the close of the trial,
the prosecution contended that the accused killed the priests for their rifles.
Defense counsel argued that the Inuit should be judged by the standards of
their own culture.  The judge instructed the jury that the cultural defense must
be rejected.  He also told the jury that if Sinisiak was found guilty of murder, he
would have no choice, under Canadian law, but to sentence him to death.
However, the judge also stated that he would recommend clemency, which he
was confident would be granted.  After an hour of deliberation, the jury re-
turned a verdict of not guilty.
                                                          
168. Also noteworthy is the fact that the accused does not sit with his defense counsel.  Rather, he
must sit in the “prisoner’s box” throughout the trial.  This rule applies even to the accused who are free
on their own recognizance.  However, in the light of the Kaufman Report, this practice has been
changed in Ontario.  See King, supra note 160.
169. Edwin R. Keedy, A Remarkable Murder Trial: Rex v. Sinnisiak, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 48 (1951).
For additional discussion of the incident upon which the charges were brought, see ROGER BULIARD,
INUK (1951); RICHARD FINNIE, THE LURE OF THE NORTH (1940).
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The story did not end in Edmonton.  Within six days, the accused were
moved 200 miles south to Calgary, and both Inuit were tried for the death of
the second priest.  After forty-five minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty but with the strongest recommendation of mercy.  Both men
were sentenced to death by hanging, as required by law, but the Inuit were told
that the sentence was deferred until the “Big Chief far away” could review it.
On August 19, 1916, the death sentence was commuted to life in prison, and
they were returned to the Arctic under custody of the Mounted Police and held
first at Herschel Island and then at Great Slave Lake.  In 1919, the two were
released from custody and returned to their people.  However, the order of re-
lease contained the requirement that they make known to others that:
Eskimos live and are governed under a system of law . . . with equality as against both
white man, Indian and Eskimo . . . .  [W]hile . . . these prisoners have been visited by a
dispensation of mercy whereby their lives have been spared . . . these reasons are not
likely to prevail on another occasion, either for them or for any other Eskimo, seeing
that the proceedings in the present case have served to inform them of their responsi-
bilities, and that they are solemnly charged with their duty to serve God and honour
the King and carefully to observe his laws.170
Rex v. Sinisiak serves as a seminal event in attempts to establish the rule of
law for aboriginal peoples living in Canada’s Northern territories, and some of
its themes exist in modern attempts to provide and legitimate law among the
Inuit and Indian tribal peoples living in these isolated areas.  The jury system is
one part of the story.171  These territories cover almost three and a half million
square kilometers, covering four time zones, with a total population of under
60,000 persons.  The sixty-five communities in this area range from a popula-
tion of eleven to about 14,000 persons, with an average population of approxi-
mately 500 residents; in the smaller communities, the majority are aboriginals.
There are four major ethnic groups: Inuit (thirty-seven percent of population),
Dene (sixteen percent), Metis (seven percent), and “nonnatives” (thirty-nine
percent).  Nine different languages are spoken, and some dialects are so distinct
that peoples speaking the same language cannot easily understand one another.
Reflecting social problems that are similar to those experienced by aboriginal
peoples all over the world who come in contact with modern culture, the ma-
jority of charged crimes involve native accused.
In the first half of this century, the problems of isolation and sparse popula-
tions resulted in few jury trials.  Rather, cases tended to be tried by a judge or
magistrate.  However, with the establishment of the Territorial Court of the
Northwest Territories in 1955, accused persons have increasingly exercised the
right to jury trial.  In the first fourteen years, there was an average of five trials
                                                          
170. Keedy, supra note 169, at 67.
171. Except where otherwise noted, this discussion about the jury system is based upon Christopher
Gora, Jury Trials in the Small Communities of the Northwest Territories, 13 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS
JUST. 156 (1993).
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per year.172  The Criminal Code provided for six-person juries in the Northwest
Territories because of the sparseness of population, and until 1965, women
were prohibited from serving.  Additionally, an eligibility requirement for
service was an ability to speak English.  In consequence, between 1955 and
1968, despite the fact that aboriginal peoples were the accused in fifty-five per-
cent of the cases, aboriginals served on only twenty-seven of the sixty-six jury
trials and typically as only one of the six members.173
In 1965, women were declared eligible to serve on juries, and in 1985 the
six- person jury was declared unconstitutional.174  In 1988, an amendment to the
Jury Act permitted unilingual jurors.175  Between 1987 and 1991, the latest date
for which figures are available, an average of forty-seven jury trials took place
per year.176
Christopher Gora conducted formal interviews with judges, lawyers, and
other persons connected to the court process that revealed a number of prob-
lems with the implementation of jury trials.177  While every effort is made to
keep the trial in the community in which the offense occurred, major problems
have arisen in this regard.  Sometimes the community is too small to obtain a
jury, particularly when many of its members are related to the victim or the ac-
cused.  Linguistic problems continue to be a source of difficulty because of the
lack of trained interpreters.  In addition, local political struggles between fami-
lies and ruling cliques can prevent the formation of a jury in that location.
Thus, a change of venue is required, bringing additional problems regarding
preparation of the case and accessibility of witnesses.  Many of Gora’s respon-
dents also noted a substantial trend toward acquittals, especially in comparison
to trials before a judge alone.178  Additionally, there appears to be a greater re-
luctance to serve on juries than elsewhere in Canada.  Both the acquittal rates
and the reluctance to serve may reflect unwillingness to pass judgment on one’s
neighbor.  However, it also appears to reflect a preference for community val-
ues and traditional cultural ways of handling deviance that are in conflict with
the legal values and processes of the broader Canadian society.
Gora discussed a number of potential reforms that might ease the difficul-
ties of jury trial in the Canadian North.179  These include simplifying the charge
to make the language more accessible to the jurors and altering the configura-
                                                          
172. See W.G. Morrow, A Survey of Jury Verdicts in the Northwest Territories, 8 ALTA L. REV. 50,
54-58 (1970); see also JACK SISSONS, JUDGE OF THE FAR NORTH 181-86 (1968) (discussing the legal
system in the Northwest Territories).
173. There were two all-native juries.  See Morrow, supra note 172, at 56-57.
174. See R. v. Punch [1985] 22 C.C.C.3d 289 (N.W.T.S.C.).
175. See Gora, supra note 171, at 162.  Unilingual jurors are provided with translators.  Gora noted
that the issue of translators attending the actual jury deliberations had not yet arisen.  See id. at 167.
176. See id. at 170.
177. See id. at 170-74.
178. This problem was also raised during informal interviews that I undertook in Baker Lake, an
Inuit community of about 1,400 persons, in the summer of 1997.
179. See Gora, supra note 171, at 174-80.
VIDMAR.FMT.DOC 08/02/99  4:04 PM
172 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 2
tion of the court180 to make it more similar to traditional community forums,
allowing the community to select the jury pool, and allowing community input
into sentencing.  Nevertheless, in some respects the essential problems of com-
patibility of jury trial with the culture and values of aboriginal peoples reflected
in R. v. Sinisiak remain, even as these peoples obtain greater exposure to the
rest of Canada.181
VI
CONCLUSION
The Canadian jury system is at once conservative and progressive.  It ex-
hibits conservative elements of an earlier age regarding judicial control over
the trial process.  On the other hand, there are trends in its continuing evolu-
tion that attempt to take into account the influence of modern mass media on
the fairness of trial, and potential racism resulting from changes in Canada’s
demographic profile.  The recognition that the presumption of impartiality may
not always hold even when reinforced with strong judicial instructions involves
an implicit recognition of twentieth century psychological understanding of
human behavior.  Concern about the legitimacy of the jury system in the eyes
of minority groups and the small steps that have been taken  to increase the ac-
tual and perceived fairness are another indication of these progressive trends.
This is not to say that the system is ideal.  The balancing between competing
values and policies has required compromises of substance and process.  The
developments in Canadian case law also help to illustrate the need to view the
jury system in the context of the broader legal and social systems in which it is
embedded.  The effectiveness of the jury system for the demographic, social,
and cultural conditions of Canada’s arctic and subarctic regions can be debated.
Nevertheless, as a whole, the criminal jury remains a robust institution in the
scheme of Canadian life and law.
                                                          
180. Having no formal courthouse, trials in smaller communities take place in hotels, community
centers, or schools.  The temporary spatial designs, however, are made similar to more traditional
court settings.
181. On April 1, 1999, the Northwest Territories were divided into two regions with an evolving
mandate for self-governance in many areas of community life.  The effects of these changes on the jury
system cannot be foretold at this time.
